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CruMINAL PRoCEDURE-.JuRIEs-EFFECT oF DISQUALIFIED JuROR ON

VERDICT-Defendant was convicted of selling whiskey and imprisoned
in the county jail. After the time for appeal had elapsed he discovered that
one jury member had been an unpardoned convict. In a habeas corpus proceeding the defendant urged that the judgment was void and subject to collateral
attack. The county court refused to discharge the defendant. On appeal, held,
· affirmed. Discovery after the verdict that a convict sat on the jury, contrary
to statute,1 gives an automatic right to a new trial. However, since the defect
only renders the verdict voidable and not void it must be challenged within
the time allotted for appeal or motion for a new trial and it cannot be the subject
of a collateral- attack in a habeas corpus proceeding. E.x parte Bronson, (Tex.
Crim. App. 1952) 254 S.W. (2d) 117.
The discovery after the verdict that a disqualified person sat on the jury
is generally held not an automatic ground for a new trial.2 However, the
defect may be a sufficient basis for a new trial in the discretion of the court
where it appears that reasonable diligence was exercised to discover the defect
on voir dire, 8 and that the defect probably caused an unjust verdict. 4 These
two requirements must be proved by compelling evidence. The :inajority of
THE

1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) art. 616.
2 See annotation, 126 A.L.R. 518 (1940).
8 Piper v. Flagg, 92 N.H. 405, 32 A. (2d) 324 (1943);

Cottman v. Federman Co.,
71 Ohio App. 89, 47 N.E. (2d) 1009 (1942).
4 James v. State, 68 Ark. 464, 60 S.W. 29 (1900); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213
Pa. 432, 62 A. 1064 (1906).
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the courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts and grant new trials because of
a disqualified juror, because it is feared that should they do so "as soon as the
accused was convicted the trial of jurors would begin."5 Some courts, however,
will grant a new trial merely upon the showing that a disqualified person sat
on the jury and that the defect was urged on the court within the time allotted
for a new trial or appeal. 6 Of the courts following the minority approach, some
distinguish among the various statutory disabilities concerning jury service
and hold that there is an automatic right to a new trial only where the juror
was physically or mentally incompetent or an unpardoned convict.7 No reason
has been advanced for the inclusion of unpardoned convicts in this class beyond
the old common law requirement that a jury be composed of twelve "good and
true" men. 8 A very few courts have ventured the theory that the participation
of a juror who is not qualified to sit completely voids the verdict.9 However,
the cases in which this theory was presented were decided on direct appeal
and not on collateral attack.1 Furthermore, later cases in these jurisdictions
have largely explained away the dicta in the earlier decisions.11
The operation of the majority and minority approaches can best be explored
in the light of three different fact situations. (I) The party who subsequently
complains about the defect may have failed to question the juror in regard to
the disqualification on voir dire. The majority of the courts, in this instance,
would probably deny the motion for a new trial on the ground that reasonable
diligence has not been shown by the moving party. 12 The minority view, on

°

5 Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. (Pa.) 415 at 422 (1844). Motions for new
trial have been denied where it was discovered after the verdict that some of the jurors were
not on the jury list as selected by the jury commissioners, Morgan v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
543, 67 S.W. 420 (1902), or were not citizens of the state, People v. Evans, 124 Cal. 206,
56 P. 1024 (1899), or were aliens, Neal v. Neal, 181 Mich. 114, 147 N.W. 624 (1914),
or were interested in the outcome of the suit, Daniels v. Lowell, 139 Mass. 56, 29 N.E.
222 (1885), or had expressed completely prejudicial statements prior to and during the trial,
Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P. (2d) 507 (1939), or were
related to the opposing party, Lumber Co. v. Moss, 186 Ark. 30, 52 S.W. (2d) 49 (1932),
or were younger than the statutory age limit, Johns v. Hodges, 60 Md. 215 (1883), or
older, Blair v. Paterson, 131 Mo. App. 122, 110 S.W. 615 (1908), or were unpardoned
convicts, Goad v. State, 106 Tenn. 175, 61 S.W. 79 (1900); State v. Wilson, 230 Mo.
647, 132 s.w. 238 (1910).
6 See Netter v. Louisville R. Co., 134 Ky. 678, 121 S.W. 636 (1909), for a representative decision. See also 126 A.L.R. 518 (1940).
7 Wright v. Davis, 184 Ga. 846, 193 S.E. 757 (1937). See also State v. Levy, 187
N.C. 583, 122 S.E. 386 (1924).
s Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 337, 77 S.E. 189 (1913).
9Williams v. State, note 8 supra; Garrett v. Wienburg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341
(1898). The court in the principal case overruled dicta to the same effect in Johnson v.
State, 129 Tex. Crim. 162, 84 S.W. (2d) 240 (1935).
10 See note 9 supra.
11 E.g., State v. Kennedy, 177 S.C. 195, 181 S.E. 35 (1935), explaining Garrett v.
Wienburg, note 9 supra.
12 Morley v. Cranmore Skimobiles, (D.C. N.H. 1946) 67 F. Supp. 812; Alexander
v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 30 A. (2d) 757 (1943). There may be a possible
exception to the rule where questioning would have been fruitless. See Moore v. Farmers'
Mutual Ins. Assn., 107 Ga. 199, 33 S.E. 65 (1899). See also Sinsheimer v. Edward Weil
Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) 129 S.W. 187, where the court held that denial of a new
trial was within the trial court's discretion even though counsel was prohibited by statute
from asking the juror whether he had ever been convicted of a crime.
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the other hand, would not deny the motion for this reason, since diligence
need not be shown. 13 (2) The complaining party may question the disqualified
juror but receive a false answer. Clearly in this situation the minority courts
will grant a new trial.14 However, the matter is still not free from difficulty
under the majority rule. A few courts adhering to the majority view insist that
the falsification be intentional,15 while others require that the question asked
on voir dire be specific and not general.16 Further, the majority rule requires
that the verdict be "probably unjust" before a new trial will be granted.17 (3)
The complaining party's challenge for cause may be erroneously overruled by
the trial court. The minority courts grant a new trial in this situation without
hesitation,1 8 while the majority will grant a new trial if some prejudice to the
complaining party can be shown.19 Seemingly, the majority approach operates
as fairly to the complaining party in every instance as does the minority view,
and carries with it none of the disadvantages of trial inconvenience and uncertainty of verdict that follow in the wake of the minority view. The requirement that the verdict must be at least "probably unjust" appears eminently
sound. The requirement that the unsuccessful party must show that he
exercised reasonable diligence to discover the defect on voir dire is based upon
the principle that in the absence of such diligence the party has waived any
right he may have to complain.20 Some courts have attacked this requirement
on the theory that a party cannot waive what he does not know.21 The answer
to this contention is simply that negligent ignorance works a waiver in the
same manner as actual knowledge.22 In the principal case the court held that
the defendant could not complain about the disqualified juror after the time
for direct appeal had elapsed, since the defect only made the verdict voic;lable
and not void. However, had the defendant made a timely appeal or motion
for new trial, the court indicates that it would have been granted "without
13 See 1 THOMPSON, TRIALS §116 (1912).
14 Olympic Realty Co. v. Kamer, 283 Ky. 432, 141 S.W. (2d) 293 (1940).
15 Waeckerly v. Colonial Baking Co., 228 Mo. App. 1185, 67 S.W. (2d) 779 (1934);
Lane v. Vaselius, 137 Misc. 756, 244 N.Y.S. 585 (1930).
16 Lankford v. Thompson, 354 Mo. 220, 189 S.W. (2d) 217 (1945); Priest v.
Cafferata, 57 Nev. 153, 60 P. (2d) 220 (1936).
11 Meier v. Edsall, 192 Okla. 529, 137 P. (2d) 926 (1943); Kuzminski v. Waser,
314 Ill. App. 438, 41 N.E. (2d) 1008 (1942).
18 Klyce v. State, 79 Miss. 652, 31 S. 339 (1902); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Krayenbuhl, 70 Neb. 766, 98 N.W. 44 (1904).
19 A usual requirement is that the complaining party's peremptory challenges were
exhausted, since otherwise he might have removed the offensive juror, or that upon the
removal of the offensive juror by peremptory challenge he had none left to use upon other
jurors. See Goad v. State, note 5 supra.
20 Turley v. State, 74 Neb. 471, 104 N.W. 934 (1905); Queenan v. Territory, 11
Okla. 261, 71 P. 218 (1901).
21Bristow v. Commonwealth, 15·Gratt. (56 Va.) 634 (1859).
22 State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1905); State v. Clarke, 34 Wash.
485, 76 P. 98 (1904).
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regard to a showing of injury or probable injury or of consent or waiver."28
While the result in the principal case seems sound, the reasoning is based upon
the minority view and is therefore subject to question.

Joseph M. Kortenhof, S.Ed.

23

Principal case at 121.

